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The Walker Process Doctrine:
Infringement Lawsuits as Antitrust Violations
Herbert Hovenkamp *
Introduction
Any patent holder, including a monopolist, may challenge an
infringement of its patent or other IP rights. Of course, defending the
infringement suit may prove costly to the alleged infringer. Further, if
the latter's product is itself the alleged infringement, the patentee
acting in good faith is entitled to notify the infringer's customers. 1
Customers using infringing articles may themselves be contributory
infringers 2 and may therefore require indemnification security from
the infringement defendant or if sufficiently frightened may stop
dealing altogether. Subjecting a potential or actual rival to such
burdens may weaken it or even dissuade it from beginning or
continuing its rivalry with the monopolist patentee -- and perhaps
without regard to the merits of the infringement claim.
As a result, suing on a patent in bad faith -- for example,
where the patent was wrongfully obtained or the patentee knows that
the rival is not an infringer -- is "exclusionary" in the '2 sense.
Further, since improperly motivated litigation in this sense is a
"sham," neither is it protected by the Noerr doctrine. 3
To summarize:
*

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
1

E.g., Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.
1999); Super Prods Corp. v. D P Way Corp., 546 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1976); Deltec
v. Laster, 326 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1964); Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co. v. Task Force Tips,
Inc., 867 F.Supp. 782 (N.D. Ind. 1994). See also PennPac Intern., Inc. v. Rotonics
Mfg., Inc., 2001 WL 569264 (E.D.Pa. 2001) (similar; absent bad faith the federal
right to notify potential infringer's customers preempts state tort claims arising out
of the notifications). Contrast Alexander v. Nat'l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173,
1200-1203 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983) (harassing rivals'
customers concerning pending infringement litigation not protected).
2

35 U.S.C. '271(a).

3

See 1 Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law Ch. 2A (3d
ed. 2006) (hereinafter "Antitrust Law").
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$

In Walker Process the Supreme Court declared that an
infringement lawsuit based on a patent that was
acquired by "fraud" could be the basis for an
infringement defendant's antitrust lawsuit against the
infringement plaintiff. 4
This lawsuit most typically
proceeds by way of counterclaim to the infringement
suit; but the courts have also approved the submission
of Walker Process claims in declaratory judgment
actions and even in primary lawsuits filed under the
Sherman Act. 5

$

In today's parlance "fraud" most typically refers to
"inequitable conduct" by the applicant during the patent
application process. But not every imperfection in a
patent application process is sufficient to make a patent
unenforceable. The Federal Circuit has set high
standards for inequitable conduct, which require an
actual intent to deceive the patent examiner and a
showing of "materiality," which means that the
examiner would very likely not have issued the patent
had he or she known the truth. That court has set even
higher standards for establishing that a lawsuit on such
a patent constitutes an antitrust violation.

$

The realm of exclusionary practices regarding patent
claims is broader than inequitable conduct, however,
and covers any assertion of an IP right to exclude
others while knowing that the IP right in question is
unenforceable under the circumstances. The antitrust
conduct can consist of such things as: (1) filing an
infringement suit on a patent that the patentee knew or
should have known was unenforceable as a result of
inequitable conduct or other imperfections in the
application process; (2) filing of an infringement suit
when the infringement plaintiff knew or should have
known that the rival's technology did not infringe; (3)
4

Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172 (1965).
5

See discussion infra.
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filing an infringement suit based on an expired patent.
The '2 claim can also be based on exclusionary
actions other than the filing of an infringement suit,
such as threats to sue, writing letters to the rival's
customers threatening them with contributory
infringement actions while knowing that no infringement
is taking place, and the like.
$

The antitrust conduct under '2 is an "exclusionary"
practice, and as such must be evaluated as of the time
it is asserted. The relevant question is whether the
patentee knew or should have known at the time it filed
its lawsuit or took other exclusionary action that the IP
right being asserted was invalid or unenforceable in the
particular situation. The conduct before the PTO is
often relevant but does not necessarily determine the
antitrust claim. We believe that the conduct should be
evaluated by objective criteria.

$

In all cases involving '2 the conduct must be
reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging
monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of
rivals. 6 This entails that the exclusionary force of the
conduct must be evaluated for its effect on price and
output in a properly defined antitrust market. Often this
will require the tribunal to assess the exclusionary
power of the improperly asserted patent itself; however,
in a monopoly maintenance case it may be sufficient to
show that the infringement plaintiff has a dominant
market share in the business from which exclusion of
the rival is threatened.
When such power or
competitive effects are lacking, the person targeted by
a bad faith IP claim may have a state law tort action for
fraud or malicious prosecution.
Fraud, inequitable conduct, and other improprieties

Wrongfully brought infringement actions can be based on
fraudulently obtained patents, and in those cases the fraud or
6

See 3 Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &651a (3d
ed. 2008).
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inequitable conduct in obtaining the patent establishes the
impropriety of the subsequent infringement action -- one who acted
fraudulently in obtaining a patent necessarily knows its patent is
unenforceable. 7 But infringement actions can also be qualifying
exclusionary practices under '2 when they are based on valid
patents that are known by the infringement plaintiff to be
unenforceable as a result of improprieties in procurement, or on valid
patents but where the infringement plaintiff knew or should have
known that the infringement defendant was not an infringer. 8
Wrongfulness can also be established when the infringement plaintiff
bases its cause of action on unreasonable and clearly incorrect
interpretations of questions of law. For example, an action for
contributory infringement is proper against one who sells a nonstaple
good under circumstances where the buyer of the good must infringe
the patent in order to make use of the good. 9 But an action against
the manufacturer of a staple good with numerous non-infringing uses
would be clearly contrary to law and thus presumably brought in bad

7

Of course, principles of res judicata apply. See Abbott Laboratories v.
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75617 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 23, 2007)
(infringement defendant/counterclaimant adequately alleged Walker Process
violation; while the court could take judicial notice of another decision finding that
patentee had not engaged in inequitable conduct before PTO [Abbott v. Torpharm,
2006 WL 2458717 (N. D. Ill. 2004)], Mylan was not a party to that litigation and
thus the facts found there were not dispositive as to it; citing GE Capital Corp. v.
Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 1997) (a court "cannot
achieve through judicial notice what it cannot achieve through collateral estoppel"
when the plaintiff in a subsequent action was not a party to the previous action and
"has never been afforded an opportunity to present its evidence and arguments on
the claim")).
8

See, e.g., United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F.Supp. 304, 312 (E.D.Mich.
1951), aff'd 343 U.S. 444 (1952) (lawsuits on machine alleged to infringe but that
patentee had never examined); Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. International Nutrition Co.,
175 F. Supp. 2d 296, 313-314 (D. Conn. 2001) (antitrust claim survived motion to
dismiss where it alleged that defendant's prior patent infringement action was
objectively baseless because it did not reasonably have ownership of the patent in
question). Suits for contributory infringement against those making products
complementary to the patented product could also qualify as exclusionary
practices. Such suits are authorized in 35 U.S.C. '271(d); '271(c) of that statute
defines contributory infringement.
9

For the definition of contributory infringement and further explanation, see
10 Phillip E. Areeda, Einer Elhauge and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law
&1781b (2d ed. 2003).
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faith. 10
The important difference between infringement actions based
on fraudulently procured patents and other improper infringement
actions is that for the latter the conduct in obtaining the patent does
not in and of itself establish impropriety. It must additionally be
established that the enforcer knew or should have known at the time
of bringing the suit that the patent was unenforceable under the
circumstances in question. Nevertheless, this difference is readily
exaggerated. The all important question in either circumstance is
whether the patentee has (1) committed an exclusionary act that is
(2) not authorized by the patent law.
The exclusionary act is most generally a patent infringement
suit, or in some cases another assertion of the patent's exclusionary
power. As a result the wrongfulness of the act must be assessed as
of the time it is asserted. As a general proposition, merely obtaining
a patent by fraud, with no subsequent enforcement attempt, is not an
exclusionary practice under '2. 11 Once the infringement action is
filed the relevant question becomes whether the infringement plaintiff
knew or should have known that the action is improper, and this can
result from any deficiency including but not limited to fraud or
inequitable conduct before the PTO.
Typically, but not always, the antitrust claim is a compulsory
counterclaim to the underlying infringement suit. First, the patentee
files its infringement action. Then, the infringement defendant 12
answers that the asserted patent is invalid or unenforceable under
the circumstances, or that the infringement defendant's technology
10

See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980);
and 35 U.S.C. '271(c), whose provision on contributory infringement expressly
excludes "a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use...."
11

See Cygnus Therapeutic Systems v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153 (Fed. Cir.
1996). On the possibility of a proceeding under the Federal Trade Commission
Act, see 3 Antitrust Law &705c (3d ed. 2008).
12

To simplify the exposition this Paragraph uses the terms "infringement
plaintiff" and "infringement defendant" to refer to the original parties to an
infringement action; and "antitrust plaintiff" and "antitrust defendant" to refer to the
parties with respect to the antitrust countersuit.
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does not infringe. In addition, the infringement defendant
counterclaims, alleging that the unwarranted infringement action is
itself monopolization or an attempt to monopolize a market covered
by or related to the patent in question.
In Nobelpharma 13 the Federal Circuit explored the relationship
between the Supreme Court's Professional Real Estate (PRE)
decision 14 and its earlier Walker Process conclusion 15 that obtaining
a patent by fraud and then attempting to enforce it could constitute
an antitrust violation. The infringement plaintiff had filed suit on a
patent that was found to be invalid for failure to disclose the best
mode for carrying out an invention. The main purpose of this
requirement is to permit those examining the patent to learn the best
mode for applying the invention without undue experimentation, thus
facilitating the entry of the innovation into the public domain once the
patent expires. In this case the Swedish patentee had additional
information about the best mode for carrying out its invention, but
that information was not disclosed and did not appear in the
application for a United States patent. The jury concluded from this
evidence that the patent had been obtained by fraud. 16
The court indicated that antitrust liability for an improperly
brought patent infringement suit can be established by one of two
alternative routes:
A patentee who brings an infringement suit may be subject to
antitrust liability for the anti-competitive effects of that suit if
the alleged infringer (the antitrust plaintiff) proves (1) that the
asserted patent was obtained through knowing and willful
fraud within the meaning of Walker Process ..., or (2) that the
infringement suit was "a mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the
13

Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 876 (1998) (vacating and withdrawing the previous panel opinion
published at 129 F.3d 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
14

See Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508
U.S. 49 (1993) ("PRE").
15

See note 4.

16

Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1062.
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business relationships of a competitor...." 17
The court then noted Justice Harlan's Walker Process
concurrence seeking to distinguish patents obtained by deliberate
fraud from patents "rendered invalid or unenforceable for other
reasons...." 18 He feared that permitting private antitrust challenges
to
also reach monopolies practiced under patents that for one
reason or another may turn out to be voidable under one or
more of the numerous technicalities attending the issuance of
a patent, might well chill the disclosure of inventions through
the obtaining of a patent because of fear of the vexations or
punitive consequences of treble-damage suits.
The Federal Circuit then observed that:
Consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Walker
Process, as well as Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, we
have distinguished "inequitable conduct" from Walker Process
fraud, noting that inequitable conduct is a broader, more
inclusive concept than the common law fraud needed to
support a Walker Process counterclaim. 19
Fraud was defined the in the common law sense as:
(1) a representation of a material fact, (2) the falsity of that
representation, (3) the intent to deceive or, at least, a state of
mind so reckless as to the consequences that it is held to be
the equivalent of intent (scienter), (4) a justifiable reliance
upon the misrepresentation by the party deceived which
17

Nobelpharma, id. at 1068, citing Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961), and Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
18

Id. at 1069, quoting Walker Process, note 4, 382 U.S. at 179-80 (Harlan,
J., concurring).
19

Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069. See also DDAVP Direct Purchaser
Antitrust Litigation, 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75726 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006) (mere
inequitable conduct as opposed to fraud before PTO insufficient to create Walker
Process claim on part of purchasers).
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induces him to act thereon, and (5) injury to the party
deceived as a result of his reliance on the
misrepresentation. 20
Clearly, a patent might be invalid or unenforceable for reasons
falling short of fraud in this common law sense. Further, an
infringement action might be improper even though the patent is
valid -- as, for example, when the patentee knows that the
infringement defendant's technology does not infringe because none
of the claims in the asserted patent cover it. 21
The court then addressed an issue left undecided by the
Supreme Court in its PRE decision 22 -- namely, how "Noerr applies
to the ex parte application process," and particularly, "how it applies
to the Walker Process claim." 23 The Federal Circuit itself had twice
refused to resolve this issue. 24 The court then concluded:
PRE and Walker Process provide alternative legal grounds on
which a patentee may be stripped of its immunity from the
antitrust laws; both legal theories may be applied to the same
conduct. Moreover, we need not find a way to merge these
decisions. Each provides its own basis for depriving a patent
owner of immunity from the antitrust laws; either or both may
be applicable to a particular party's conduct in obtaining and
20

Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069-1070. See also Unitherm Food Sys., Inc.
v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1358 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev'd on
nonantitrust grds., 546 U.S. 394 (2006) (repeating these requirements; ultimately
rejecting antitrust claim for failure to show relevant market; on intent, the court
stated that "a state of mind so reckless as to the consequences that it is held to be
the equivalent of intent" will suffice to show fraud).
21

In the copyright context, see PRE, note 14, where the validity of the
infringement plaintiff's copyright was not in dispute; rather, the antitrust
counterclaim was based on the legal theory that the compensated playing of a
videodisc in a hotel room was not an infringement of the copyright.
22

See note 14.

23

Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071, quoting district court opinion, 930 F.Supp.
at 1253, which was in turn referring to PRE, note 14, 508 U.S. at 61 n. 6.
24

Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071, citing FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67
F.3d 931, 939 n. 2 (Fed.Cir.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 814 (1996); Carroll
Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1583 n. 10 (Fed.Cir.1993).
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enforcing a patent. The Supreme Court saw no need to
merge these separate lines of cases and neither do we. 25
First, the court held, if the fraud elements of the Walker
Process claim could be made out, as well as the "other criteria" for
antitrust liability, 26 "such liability can be imposed without the
additional sham inquiry required under PRE." 27 That is, assuming
the patent was procured by fraud and the other elements of an
antitrust claim were met, an infringement suit based on that patent
encountered automatic antitrust liability.
By contrast,
irrespective of the patent applicant's conduct before the PTO,
an antitrust claim can also be based on a PRE allegation that
a suit is baseless; in order to prove that a suit was within
Noerr's "sham" exception to immunity, an antitrust plaintiff
must prove that the suit was both objectively baseless and
subjectively motivated by a desire to impose collateral,
anti-competitive injury rather than to obtain a justifiable legal
remedy. 28
As the court explained:
Thus, under PRE, a sham suit must be both
subjectively brought in bad faith and based on a theory of
either infringement or validity that is objectively baseless.
Accordingly, if a suit is not objectively baseless, an antitrust
defendant's subjective motivation is immaterial. In contrast
with a Walker Process claim, a patentee's activities in
procuring the patent are not necessarily at issue. It is the
bringing of the lawsuit that is subjectively and objectively
baseless that must be proved. 29
25

Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071.

26

On these other requirements, see 1 Antitrust Law &208 ("sham" filings
constitute only the conduct element of antitrust offense).
27

Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071.

28

Nobelpharma, id. at 1071, citing PRE, 508 U.S. at 60-61.

29

Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1072.
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In sum, in the Federal Circuit's conception the "bringing of the
lawsuit" was the relevant antitrust act for a PRE style claim, while it
was the patentee's actions in procuring its patent that were relevant
to the Walker Process antitrust claim. To us, the two actions do not
differ all that much, and the "bringing of the lawsuit" or similar
exclusionary activity is in fact the gravamen of both offenses.
In Nobelpharma the court found substantial evidence from
which a jury could have reached factual conclusions that would "strip
NP [the infringement plaintiff] of its immunity from antitrust liability." 30
This evidence indicated that the patentee had fraudulently failed to
disclose information to the PTO that would have prevented the
patent from being issued. Evidence in the record supported a finding
of Walker Process fraud on all of the elements listed above. Further,
there was evidence that the defendant brought its infringement suit
with knowledge that the patent application had been fraudulent. 31
Nevertheless, the distinctions between Walker Process
antitrust liability and liability for "sham" infringement litigation are
somewhat elusive. First, while Walker Process itself spoke as if
"obtaining" a patent by fraud was the gravamen of the antitrust
defense, 32 the actual facts were that the patent holder was bringing
an infringement action. As noted previously, simply obtaining a
patent fraudulently with no subsequent enforcement activity does not
violate the Sherman Act, although it may violate the FTC Act. 33 Of
course, one might enforce a fraudulently obtained patent in other
ways than by making or threatening infringement actions. For
example, one might simply assert the patent and warn a potential
rival to stay out of the market the patent assertedly covers; or one
might insist on collecting a royalty for technology allegedly covered
by such a patent. Clearly a patent obtained by fraud could be used
30

Nobelpharma, id. at 1073.

31

Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1072.

32

See Walker Process, note 4, 382 U.S. at 174, sustaining an amended
counterclaim alleging that the antitrust defendant "illegally monopolized interstate
and foreign commerce by fraudulently and in bad faith obtaining and maintaining ...
its patent ... well knowing that it had no basis for ... a patent...."
33

The Federal Circuit recognizes this proposition. See, Cygnus case, note

11.
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in an anticompetitive way falling short of an infringement suit.
Whether such practices are sufficiently exclusionary so as to violate
the antitrust laws cannot be stated categorically.
Second, once an infringement action is brought or
threatened 34 then the "sham" issue is addressed first by considering
whether the lawsuit is objectively baseless. 35 A large number of
defects could render a lawsuit objectively baseless, including but not
limited to these: (1) the patent may have been procured by fraud in
the Walker Process sense, and thus be invalid and unenforceable; 36
(2) the patent may be rendered unenforceable by inequitable
conduct before the PTO or by other knowledge or activities falling
short of fraud; (3) The patent may have expired; 37 (4) the patent may
be valid and enforceable, but the infringement plaintiff may know or
should have known that the infringement defendant's technology
does not infringe the patent; 38 (5) the infringement defendant's
actions may be lawful as a result of a previously granted license; 39
34

On Noerr protection for threatened litigation, provided it is not a "sham,"
see 1 Antitrust Law &205e. See also Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles,
84 IND. L.J. (2008) (advocating antitrust remedy).
35

See 1 Antitrust Law &205b.

36

Cf. Open LCR.Com, Inc. v. Rates Tech., Inc.., 112 F.Supp.2d 1223
(D.Colo. 2000) (plaintiff's allegations that patentee failed to disclose prior art to
PTO and then threatened and brought infringement claims without realistic
expectation of success on merits, even after antitrust plaintiff documented the
existence of the prior art, were sufficient to support antitrust action).
37

See International Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. Pilkington PLC, 137 F.3d 1382
(9th Cir. 1998) (infringement suit based on expired patents a possible antitrust
violation).
38

Cf. Besser case, note 8 (infringement plaintiff did not have good reason to
believe that infringement defendant's technology infringed); Moore USA, Inc. v.
Standard Register Co., 139 F.Supp. 2d 348 W.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to dismiss
Sherman '2 counterclaim allegation that patentee filed infringement claim while
knowing that counterclaimant's product did not infringe because it did not
incorporate an essential ingredient); Ecrix Corp. v. Exabyte Corp., 95 F.Supp.2d
1155 (D.Colo. 2000) (for purposes of filing antitrust claim, infringement defendant
was entitled to discovery of factual basis for infringement plaintiff's allegations that
former's technology infringed the latter's patent).
39

Cf. Glass Equip. Dvlpmnt. v. Besten, 174 F.3d 1337 (Fed.Cir. 1999)
(patentee sued for infringement; alleged infringer claimed it had an implied license
to use the patented technology and filed antitrust counterclaim; court finds no
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(6) there may be a legal or jurisdictional rule that makes the
infringement suit improper as a matter of law. 40
Third, the Nobelpharma decision concluded that if the
infringement defendant (antitrust plaintiff) shows that a patent was
obtained by fraud, then the unreasonableness of the infringement
suit has automatically been established. As a result no additional
jury instructions under PRE or Noerr are required. 41 The court did
not indicate what these instructions would have been, but apparently
they would have advised the jury that the right to bring an
infringement suit is broad and cannot be limited except for a proven
sham. But in that case the difference between a Walker Process
fraud case and a PRE-style infringement action is small, and
revolves only around the necessity of bringing an additional jury
instruction that, while unnecessary in the first, would have been
advisable in any event, given that the jury might have failed to find
fraud but might have found other conduct rendering the lawsuit a
sham.
The Nobelpharma decision thus seems to exaggerate the
implied license, which entails that infringement claim was well founded; thus no
antitrust violation).
40

Cf. PRE, note 14 (copyright infringement action not improperly brought
where circuits were divided on a dispositive question of law and one had sided with
the infringement plaintiff's position); Mitek Surg. Prods., Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., 230
F.3d 1383, 2000 WL 217637, 2000-1 Trade Cas. &72803 (Fed. Cir. 2000, unpub.)
(two different district courts had disagreed on claim construction of patent subject
to infringement action; patentee entitled to bring infringement action relying on the
favorable district court holding). As a general matter, claim construction presents a
question of law. See also Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996);
IMS Tech., Inc. v. Hass Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 2000),
cert. dismissed, 530 U.S. 1299 (2000); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90
F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). A lawsuit in one court based on a claim construction
broader than that given in one or more other courts raises issues analogous to
those in PRE. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley,
Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law '2.2c (2001 & 2007 Supp.). Cf. Goss Int'l
Americas, Inc. v. MAN Roland, Inc., 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75632 (D.N.H. Mar. 12,
2007) (denying Walker Process claim based on alleged inequitable conduct in
procurement of a different patent than the one being enforced when it could not be
shown that inequitable conduct in procurement of one patent would have
invalidated the second patent).
41

See Nobelpharma, note 13, 141 F.3d at 1073.
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difference between situations in which an infringement action is
unwarranted because the patent was obtained by fraud, and those
where the action is unwarranted as a result of other defects that the
infringement plaintiff clearly knew or (measured objectively) should
have known. The all important question in both is whether a
reasonable actor in the infringement plaintiff's position should have
known at the time of the lawsuit that the infringement action or other
exclusionary conduct was legally inappropriate under the
circumstances. Fraud in obtaining a patent is only one of many
circumstances rendering the infringement action inappropriate. 42
Further, while failing to require the Noerr/PRE instruction may
have been harmless error in the case at hand, that would not always
be so. First, if the jury found no fraud but found other reasons why
the suit should not have been brought, failure to give the instruction
might require a new trial. In such a case there must be a conclusion
that the lawsuit was objectively baseless, and this question could be
one of fact, depending on the circumstances. Second, there may be
situations in which even an infringement lawsuit based on a
fraudulently procured patent could not be the basis of an antitrust
counterclaim. Consider, for example, the patentee who obtains its
patent by fraud and then transfers it or gives an exclusive license to
an innocent acquirer. The acquirer, not knowing of the fraud,
believes its enforcement right to be valid and brings an infringement
suit. In such a case it would be the infringement plaintiff's actual or
objective knowledge at the time of the infringement suit that would
establish its antitrust culpability.
Whatever the limits on unfounded suits generally, the
monopolist burdening a rival with a bad faith suit clearly commits an
exclusionary act. At the same time, however, even the monopolist is
42

Consider the Supreme Court's decision in KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007), which changed the patentability standard of obviousness,
holding that the Federal Circuit had not been sufficiently strict in cases where
someone reasonably skilled in the art could have anticipated the patent claim,
even in a different field. At this writing it is too early to assess the impact of KSR
on antitrust challenges to infringement actions. Quite possibly, however, a certain
class of patents previously thought valid will now be invalid under the KSR
standard. One who brought suit on such a patent knowing of the almost certain
invalidity might reasonably be subjected to an antitrust counterclaim. This would
be an example of a change in a rule of law that subsequently rendered a certain
class of patents invalid.
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entitled to protect its property rights. Too expansive a conception of
baselessness could turn many infringement actions into antitrust
claims against the infringement plaintiff, thus putting the patent
owner at peril even in defending its own property rights. 43
As noted before some cases do not involve a filed
infringement action at all, but only a threat to sue or communications
to customers. 44 For example, consider the monopolist who -knowing its patent to be invalid -- writes a letter to a rival's customers
threatening infringement actions if they continue buying from the
rival. 45 The customers are very likely in an even poorer position than
the rival to know about the patent's invalidity. Further, the cost to a
customer of switching its patronage may be far lower than the cost to
the rival of defending any infringement action. Indeed, acting under
uncertainty the customers may switch rather than accept any
apparent risk of litigating a costly infringement suit. 46
"Sham" infringement claim or enforcement action satisfies '2
conduct requirement; tort law alternative
The improper patent infringement suit serves to establish the
conduct element of a '2 claim. 47 In addition the antitrust plaintiff
43

Antitrust's Noerr doctrine generally deals with these issues. See Ch. 2A.

44

See Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 815 (1998) ("The antitrust laws do not preclude patentees
from putting suspected infringers on notice of suspected infringement).
45

See, e.g., Johnson v. Con-Vey/Keystone, Inc., 856 F.Supp. 1443 (D.Or.
1994) (notifying rivals' customers concerning patent infringement suit not protected
by Noerr). Compare Oetiker v. Jurid Werke GmbH, 671 F.2d 596, 601 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (letter, ignored by plaintiff's suppliers, stating without bad faith that patent
holder "would be forced to vindicate its patent right if no settlement proposal were
received" constituted "neither a threat nor an enforcement sufficient to trigger the
antitrust laws").
46

See Goss Int'l Americas, Inc. v. MAN Roland, Inc., 2006 WL 1575287,
2006-2 Trade Cas. &75392 (D.N.H. June 2, 2006) (Walker Process claim did not
require that owner of fraudulently obtained patent actually file patent infringement
suit; warning letters or other threats based on such a patent could suffice; relying
on Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1344-45, 135758 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev'd in part on other grds., 126 S.Ct. 980 (2006).
47

See 1 Antitrust Law &208 (3d ed. 2006).
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must show the relevant market power requirement, which can be in
the implicated patent itself, or in the patentee's underlying market
share in a monopoly maintenance case.
If the infringement plaintiff lacks substantial power in a
relevant market but for the patent, then the antitrust plaintiff must
show that the patent itself is sufficient to confer this power or
dangerously threaten to do so, thus making the improper suit an
exclusionary practice in the '2 sense. However, if the infringement
plaintiff already has substantial power in the relevant market, then an
improper infringement action on any patent tending to exclude rivals
could be unlawfully exclusionary, even if that patent itself did not
dominate a market. 48 Finally, the evidence as a whole must be
sufficient to give rise to an inference of harm to competition.
When these structural preconditions for an antitrust violation
are lacking, the infringement defendant might nevertheless be able
to pursue a state tort claim for common law fraud, malicious
The important difference
prosecution, or a related offense. 49
48

See Netflix, Inc. v. Blockbuster, Inc., 2006 WL 2458717 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 22,
2006) (antitrust claimant sufficiently alleged power with claim that infringement
plaintiff possessed 65 percent of market for internet DVD movie rentals).
See also Golan v. Pingel Enterp., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(even if assertions of patent were improper, there was no antitrust violation
because patentee was not shown to have market power in its patented product);
William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA, LLC, 2005 WL 936928, 2005-1
Trade Cas. &74,780 (N.D. 111. Apr. 22, 2005) (refusing to dismiss Walker Process
counterclaim that patent infringement action violated '2; rejecting antitrust
defendant's argument that because basis of claim was that patent was invalid,
antitrust plaintiff could not show dangerous probability of success in creating a
monopoly-note that even if patent is significant contributor to market power, basis
of claim is that antitrust defendant was misusing infringement action so as to give
recognition to the patent); Medtronic AVE, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 2001 WL
652016, 2001-2 Trade Cas. &73,388 (D. Del. March 30, 2001) (patentee could
have violated '2 by bringing infringement action on patent procured by fraud; while
counterclaim did not allege patentee's market share, there were other ways of
measuring market power); E-Z Bozuz, L.L.C. v. Prof'l Product Research Co., Inc.,
2003 WL 22068573 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003) (rejecting antitrust counterclaim to
patent infringement suit where infringement defendant did not claim that patentee
had market power in its patented hand-tied bow maker).
49

On the relationship between baseless suits and state law malicious
prosecution claims, see Hydranautics v. Filmtec Corp., 204 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir.
2000) (Federal Circuit's determination that patent infringement suit was not
objectively basis because genuine factual issues existed about validity of patent,
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between such common law claims and the antitrust claim is that the
former equate the wrong with the conduct itself rather than with the
threat of monopoly. Of course, treble damages and attorneys fees
are very likely not available for such a claim.
Objective Standard
Infringement claims can range from a bad faith suit actually
known by its plaintiff to be groundless, to a "carelessly" brought
action, to a reasonable but uncertain suit, and to one that is both
sure and actually successful. Often reliable evidence about the
infringement plaintiff's subjective mental state will be unavailable. In
any event, in the case of valid claims mental state is irrelevant, for
the patentee just as any property owner can enforce its rights no
matter what its intent. 50
In any event, objective evidence about what is reasonable
under the circumstance often provides a basis for determining the
reasonableness of the infringement claim. Requiring objective
baselessness also encourages reasonable care in subjecting rivals
to the burdens of an infringement action. Accordingly, a monopolist's
careless challenges made without adequate inquiry into underlying
did not collaterally estop subsequent Ninth Circuit malicious prosecution action
challenging same infringement suit; while "objectively baseless" standard
governed both claims, in the malicious prosecution claim the infringement
defendant also raised issues of fraud on the patent office and perjury during
course of infringement trial). Cf. Conroy v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 2d 1049,1056 (N.D. Cal. 2004). When Del Monte threatened to enforce
patents on its hybrid pineapples the plaintiff filed a state law antitrust and unfair
competition claim, which Del Monte then removed to federal court. The latter court
then granted the plaintiff's motion to remand to state court, holding that the federal
court lacked jurisdiction because no patent issues were raised because no
infringement suit had been filed and the threats had been made with respect to
non-infringing pineapples; as a result the patent laws were not implicated.
Cf. Assessment Technologies v. Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir.
2003); 361 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (improper copyright infringement lawsuit
designed to exclude others from uncopyrightable data could be copyright misuse;
conduct alleged as tortious malicious prosecution).
50

See, e.g., Independent Service Org. (ISO) Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001) (since validity of Xerox's
patent had not been disputed, the attempt to enforce them via an infringement
counterclaim could not be baseless).
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facts or law should also be regarded as improper.
In Professional Real Estate (PRE) the Supreme Court held
that a copyright (not patent) infringement suit is immune from
antitrust challenge unless it is baseless, with baselessness
measured by an objective standard. 51
Importantly, the
"baselessness" question in PRE referred entirely to the
reasonableness of the infringement plaintiff's interpretation of the
federal copyright statute as a matter of law. The decision expressly
deferred the question of antitrust immunity if the infringement plaintiff
engaged in "fraud or other misrepresentations" of fact. 52
The relevant points respecting PRE are these:
(1) If the disputed question in the patent infringement suit is
entirely a question of law -- as, for example, whether the
infringement plaintiff's interpretation of a particular patent doctrine is
objectively reasonable 53 -- then PRE immunizes any antitrust
challenge to the infringement action when the infringement suit itself
is objectively well founded. These are essentially the facts of the
PRE case itself, except that it involved copyright rather than patent
law.
(2) PRE does not explicitly apply to the more usual case
where the question in the patent infringement suit involves a
disputed matter of fact or complex mixed questions of law and fact. 54
This could include such issues as whether the infringement
51

See note 14, 508 U.S. 49. Cf. B.V. Optische Industrie de Oude Delft v.
Hologic, Inc., 909 F.Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (fact that patent infringement suit
was settled does not establish conclusively that it could not be an antitrust
violation; to be sure, the cost of settling might be less than the cost of litigating, but
one must query whether the infringement defendant's willingness to settle indicates
that the suit must not have been objectively baseless).
52

Id. at 1929 n.6. The Court cited the majority's and Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Walker Process, note 4, 382 U.S. at 176-177, 179-180, both
of which noted that unjustified claims made in patent infringement suits typically
involve false allegations of fact rather than irrational theories of law.
53

E.g., Mitek Surgical, note 40, where the infringement claim depended on
the claim construction given to the patent, which is a question of law.
54

E.g., Carroll Touch, note 24.
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defendant's conduct actually constitutes infringement, or whether
information in the infringement plaintiff's possession or infirmities in
the patent application process renders the patent invalid or
unenforceable -- for example, where the patentee lied about
disqualifying prior sales. 55 But if the infringement plaintiff has made
an objectively reasonable investigation and has an objectively
reasonable basis for believing that its patent is valid, enforceable,
and infringed under the circumstances, then its infringement suit
enjoys antitrust immunity even if the court should subsequently
disagree and find the patent invalid, unenforceable, or not
infringed. 56
(3)
If the patent infringement claim succeeds antitrust
immunity is automatic, 57 subject to one important exception: if it
should subsequently be determined that the claim's success
depended on information which the patentee know or should have
known at the time of presenting it to be false, then the suit could still
be a "sham" and thus satisfy the conduct requirement for a '2 claim.
Although some dicta in the PRE decision might be read to immunize
any successful suit, the facts of that case involved only a disputed
question of law and the decision cannot be read to immunize a
lawsuit that was successful only because of fraudulently made
factual misrepresentations in the course of litigation. 58
55

E.g., Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S.Ct. 375 (2007) (applicant lied in application about disqualifying sales
made more than one year prior to application).
56

Note that as many as half of patents, once committed to litigation, are
found to be invalid. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on
the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (finding about 46%
of litigated patents to be invalid).
57

See Filmtec, note 24, 67 F.3d at 936. And see Contour Chair Lounge Co.
v. True-Fit Chair, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (antitrust liability for
baseless infringement suit cannot obtain when the patent was found to be valid).
58

To illustrate, the patentee whose patent was unenforceable because it
swore to the PTO that there were no disqualifying prior sales, when such sales had
actually occurred, might succeed in a subsequent infringement suit if evidence of
the prior sales was not exposed. But if exposed later, such evidence might serve
both to invalidate the patent and support the antitrust claim. See the discussion
infra of Dippin' Dots, note 55.
See Hydranautics v. Filmtec Corp., 224 Fed.Appx. 675, 2007-1 Trade Cas.
&75646 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2007, unpublished) (success in the underlying patent
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(4) In PRE the Supreme Court also said this in dicta:
Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a
court examine the litigant's subjective motivation. Under this
second part of our definition of sham, the court should focus
on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals "an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor ... through the "use [of] the governmental
process--as opposed to the outcome of that process--as an
anticompetitive weapon." This two-tiered process requires the
plaintiff to disprove the challenged lawsuit's legal viability
before the court will entertain evidence of the suit's economic
viability.
Of course, even a plaintiff who defeats the
defendant's claim to Noerr immunity by demonstrating both
the objective and the subjective components of a sham must
still prove a substantive antitrust violation. Proof of a sham
merely deprives the defendant of immunity; it does not relieve
the plaintiff of the obligation to establish all other elements of
his claim. 59
This language suggests that the '2 claim includes a
"subjective" as well as an "objective" element. These dicta should
not be read to require inquiry into the infringement plaintiff's actual
state of mind. Here, as anywhere else, intent can be inferred from
sufficiently unambiguous conduct. Consider the patentee who
himself made sales prior to the patent application that would have
barred patentability of disclosed.
The Patent Act's on sale bar
prevents patenting of a product that was sold more than a year prior
to the filing of the initial patent application. 60 The applicant signed a
infringement suit created a presumption that the suit was properly brought which
could be rebutted only by a showing of fraud or perjury). See also Hydranautics,
note 49, 204 F.3d at 887:
[T]he existence of probable cause to institute legal proceedings precludes
a finding that an antitrust defendant has engaged in sham litigation....
Under our decision today, therefore, a proper probable cause
determination irrefutably demonstrates that an antitrust plaintiff has not
proved the objective prong of the sham exception and that the defendant
is accordingly entitled to... immunity.
59

PRE, note 14, 508 U.S. at 60 (citations omitted).

60

35 U.S.C. ' 102(b).
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sworn statement to the PTO that no such sales had occurred and
years later brings an infringement action on this patent. Such a
case, if the facts are sufficiently unambiguous, would serve to
establish both the objective and the "subjective" motivation
necessary, even though there is not additional evidence of subjective
intent such as a memorandum between company officials stating "we
are bringing this lawsuit even though we know that the on sale bar
renders this patent unenforceable."
In Dippin' Dots the Federal Circuit appeared to read the PRE
language much more literally. The infringement plaintiff's patent was
rendered unenforceable by some 800 retail sales that occurred more
than a year before the initial patent application was filed. 61 The
patentee neglected to disclose this information in its application, and
the patentee's declaration contained a sworn statement that no such
sales had occurred. Public sales made more than one year prior to
filing bar patentability under '102(b) of the Patent Act, and also
serve to make the patent "obvious" under '103. 62 The court found
that the information, if disclosed, would almost certainly have barred
patentability and held the patent invalid. 63
The court nevertheless held that the degree of inequitable
conduct necessary to invalidate the patent was not as great as the
degree needed to support an antitrust claim. In this case the only
evidence of the patentee's anticompetitive intent was the fact that it
had made the 800 sales over a one week period and then later
swore to the PTO that the sales had not occurred. It subsequently
also filed a patent infringement suit against those offending one or
more of the claims made in the patent. The Federal Circuit held that
61

Dippin' Dots, note 55.

62

See 35 U.S.C. ''102(b), 103.

63

See 476 F.3d at 1346:
Absent explanation, the evidence of a knowing failure to disclose sales
that bear all the earmarks of commercialization reasonably supports an
inference that the inventor's attorney intended to mislead the PTO. The
concealment of sales information can be particularly egregious because,
unlike the applicant's failure to disclose, for example, a material patent
reference, the examiner has no way of securing the information on his
own.
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while this omission clearly qualified as inequitable conduct, it fell
short of fraud in the Walker Process sense, which requires a
stronger showing of both intent and materiality. 64 In order to support
a Walker Process antitrust case "there must be evidence of intent
separable from the simple fact of the omission." 65 The court
observed:
It might be argued that because the omitted reference was so
important to patentability, DDI [the patentee] must have
known of its importance and must have made a conscious
decision not to disclose it. That argument has some force, but
to take it too far would be to allow the high materiality of the
omission to be balanced against a lesser showing of
deceptive intent by the patentee. Weighing intent and
materiality together is appropriate when assessing whether
the patentee's prosecution conduct was inequitable. However,
when Walker Process claimants wield that conduct as a
"sword" to obtain antitrust damages rather than as a mere
"shield" against enforcement of the patent, they must prove
deceptive intent independently. 66
This approach re-creates some of the same difficulties of preMatsushita antitrust litigation under standards reluctant to grant
64

Relying on Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059,
1068-1069 (Fed.Cir.1998).
65

476 F.3d at 1347 ("The difference in breadth between inequitable conduct
and Walker Process fraud admits the possibility of a close case whose facts reach
the level of inequitable conduct, but not of fraud before the PTO. This is such a
case.").
66

476 F.3d at 1348 (internal citations omitted). The court added:
While Walker Process intent may be inferred from the facts and
circumstances of a case, "[a] mere failure to cite a reference to the PTO
will not suffice." This is not to say that an omission always reduces to
"mere failure to cite." We acknowledged in Nobelpharma "that omissions,
as well as misrepresentations, may in limited circumstances support a
finding of Walker Process fraud ... because a fraudulent omission can be
just as reprehensible as a fraudulent misrepresentation." We believe,
though, that to find a prosecution omission fraudulent there must be
evidence of intent separable from the simple fact of the omission.

(citing and quoting Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070-1071).
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summary judgment, 67 except in reverse. It requires extensive
discovery through the patentee's documents for evidence of
anticompetitive "intent" other than that manifested in the patent
application itself. Further, it makes the infringement defendant's
antitrust counterclaim dependent on the vagaries of the patentee's
document retention policy or other efforts to suppress incriminating
information, often attending pre-application activities that occurred
many years prior to the litigation. For example, in Dippin Dots the
sales found to invalidate the patent occurred in 1987.
The
subsequent patent infringement suit was filed in April of 2000, some
thirteen years later. 68 By that time the evidence of disqualifying
sales could very well have been suppressed unless available from
sources other than the patentee.
Further, the improper conduct was not limited to the
misrepresentation to the PTO about prior sales; it also consisted in
the subsequent filing of a patent infringement lawsuit, presumably
designed to exclude the infringement defendant in the hopes that the
disqualifying sales would not be discovered. Certainly one who files
a patent infringement suit with present knowledge that the patent is
unenforceable has met '2's conduct requirement.
Objectively Unreasonable Patent Litigation
Patents of questionable validity or enforceability
As noted above, PRE does not fully resolve the question of
how to determine when a patent infringement suit is a "sham" which
itself violates '2 of the Sherman Act. Patent infringement suits
typically concern disputed issues of fact, most often going to patent
validity, for which the "sham" analysis is different than it is for
questions of law. Significantly, a complaint raising nothing more than
a disputed question of law can frequently be disposed of without any
discovery or trial. Disputes raising significant disputed fact issues
often cannot be. 69
67

See 2 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &308 (3d ed.

2007).
68

See In re Dippin' Dots
(N.D.Ga.,2003) (docket entry).
69

Patent

Litigation,

249

F.Supp.2d

1346

See Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales del Centro S.A. de C.E.V.,
464 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (rejecting antitrust counterclaim to patent
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The lower courts have wrestled with this problem for some
time, and have developed strict requirements for any infringement
defendant claiming that the infringement action violated the antitrust
laws. 70 In Handgards the Ninth Circuit observed that an undue
infringement action based on claim that patentee falsely stated that certain of its
products were covered by a particular patent claim when patentee had consistently
maintained that they were covered and no court had adjudicated to the contrary;
further, its legal position seemed plausible; also, antitrust counterclaimant alleged
that patentee continued to warn former's customers of infringement even after
counterclaimant notified patentee that it had changed its process so as to no
longer infringe; patentee was entitled not to accept this notification at face value
without proof); Netflix, Inc. v. Blockbuster, Inc., 2006-2 Trade Cas. &75484
(N.D.Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (Blockbuster adequately alleged Walker Process violation
in claim that Netflix committed fraud on PTO in acquiring business method patents
and then filed bad faith infringement suit against rival; in particular Neflix failed to
reference pre-existing patents held by a third party; that Netflix knew of these
patents at the time it filed its own patent application; and that communication of the
existence of these patents to examiner would have resulted in non-issuance of
Netflix patents; court also concludes that Blockbuster adequately pled sham
litigation as an "independent" basis for its antitrust lawsuit); Synopsys, Inc. v.
Magma Design Automation, 2006 WL 1452803, 2006-1 Trade Cas. &75320
(D.Del. May 25, 2006) (plaintiff adequately pled that defendant used fraudulently
obtained patents and public accusations of infringement and other disparagement
to drive plaintiff out of business; rejecting defendant's claim that antitrust injury was
not adequately pled).
Cf. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 437 F.Supp.2d 79
(D.D.C. 2006) (defendant pioneer drug manufacturer could have violated antitrust
laws by listing patent in orange book and announcing its own plans to make a
generic version of its drug, thus ousting the plaintiff, a generic competitor, but then
refusing to go ahead with the generic; however, ultimately concluding that statute
of limitations barred the claim); General Physiotherapy, Inc., v. Sybaritic, Inc., 2006
WL 269991, 2006-1 Trade Cas. &75121 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 1, 2006) (defendants
multiplication of trademarks and possible fraud in obtaining some of them could
have violated '2; denying summary judgment); Gardner v. Clark, 101 F.Supp.2d
468 (N.D.Mis. 2000) (trademark infringement claim not objectively baseless).
70

See, e.g., Dippin' Dots, note 55; Honeywell Intern. Inc. v. Universal
Avionics Systems Corp., 488 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (dismissing antitrust
counterclaim where patent infringement action not shown to be objectively
baseless); Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(antitrust defendant's patent infringement suit was not objectively baseless even
though infringement claim failed; defendant's interpretation of the patent claim in
question was a reasonable one, and defendant was not required to give weight to
letters from accused infringers asserting the patent's invalidity); BioTechnology
General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 267 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (underlying
patent infringement suit found not to be baseless; as a result, antitrust
counterclaim dismissed); Proportion-Air, Inc. v. Buzmatics, Inc., 57 F.3d 1085,
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1995-2 Trade Cas. &71144 (Fed. Cir. unpub.) (same); Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg.
Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 141 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1998, unpublished), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 930 (1998) (antitrust complaint dismissed where infringement suit
found not to be objectively baseless); Filmtec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67 F.3d 931
(Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 814 (1999) (even though patentee lost
infringement suit, its claim was not objectively baseless); Carroll Touch, note 24,
15 F.3d at 1582-1583 (same).
See also Abbott Laboratories v. TEVA Pharmaceutical, Inc., 432
F.Supp.2d 408 (D.Del. 2006) (rejecting motion to dismiss; pioneer's patent
litigation against generics could have been a sham); Wellbutrin SR Antitrust
Litigation, 2006 WL 616292, 2006-1 Trade Cas. &75158 (E.D.Pa. March 14, 2006)
(under facts as alleged in complaint pioneer's patent infringement lawsuits against
generic producer based on doctrine of equivalence would have been known to be
frivolous; thus Walker Process claim survived motion to dismiss); Morton Grove
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Par Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2006 WL 850873, 2006-1
Trade Cas. &75179 (N.D.Ill. March 28, 2006) (plaintiff adequately pled Walker
Process claim based on knowing and wilful failures to disclose prior art at time of
antitrust defendant's patent application, including an allegation that but for the
failures to disclose the patent would not have issued; also approving "sham"
litigation claim); Albert Hazelquist v. Guchi Moochie Tackle Co., Inc., 2004 WL
1599378, 2004-2 Trade Cas. 174,498 (W.D. Wash., May 12, 2004) (trade dress;
patentee originally represented to patent office that fishing tackle device was
purely ornamental when in fact it had a function; this was not fraud sufficient to
make its subsequent infringement claim a Walker Process violation); Honeywell
Intl., Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 272 (D. Del. 2004)
(rejecting antitrust counterclaim where underlying patent infringement suit was not
objectively baseless); Applera Corp. v. MI Research, Inc., 303 F.Supp. 2d 130 (D.
Conn. 2004) (evidence that patent owner had threatened infringement suits
against other firms in order to obtain licenses and that its motives may have been
anticompetitive was irrelevant if its current infringement action was not objectively
baseless); Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (S.D.
Fla. 2004) (brand-name manufacturer's attempts to enforce its pharmaceutical
patents were not objectively baseless); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue
Labs., 90 F.Supp.2d 540 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding fact issue whether infringement
plaintiff had obtained patent by fraud; denying summary judgment on antitrust
counterclaim); Ecrix case, note 38 (requiring discovery on issue whether
infringement plaintiff had reasonable basis for concluding that infringement
defendant's technology actually infringed); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Genpharm,
Inc., 50 F.Supp.2d 367 (D.N.J. 1999) (question whether patents allegedly infringed
by defendant's suit were unenforceable and suit brought only to obtain
infringement defendant's trade secrets could not be resolved on motion to
dismiss); Baxa Corp. v. McGaw, Inc., 996 F.Supp. 1044 (D.Co. 1998), aff'd 185
F.3d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (no antitrust violation where patent was not shown to be
procured by either fraud or inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark
Office); Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 964 F.Supp. 1479 (D.Kan. 1997)
(filing of patent infringement counterclaims not an antitrust violation where the
counterclaims could not be characterized as objectively baseless).
Related decisions include Marketing Displays, Inc. v. Traffix Devices, Inc.,
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readiness to hold an infringement suit improper would diminish the
protection afforded by patent grants, contrary to their purpose. 71 To
avoid that danger, the court presumed that patent infringement
actions are reasonably brought and the antitrust plaintiff can defeat
this presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. 72 Similarly,
200 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd on nonantitrust issue, 532 U.S. 23 (2001)
(because trade dress rights can last beyond the expiration of patent rights, bringing
of a trade dress infringement suit after patent had expired was not a "sham"). Cf.
Undersea Breathing Sys., Inc. v. Nitrox Tech., Inc., 985 F.Supp. 752 (N.D.Ill.
1997), app. dism'd, 155 F.3d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (infringement defendant could
not show that infringement action constituted patent misuse or antitrust violation
where there was only weak evidence suggesting that patentee had failed to
disclose all prior art at time of application; court ultimately found insufficient
evidence that patent was invalid, but also no infringement); Publications Intl. Ltd. v.
W. Publishing Co., 1994 WL 23008, 1994-1 Trade Cas. &70,540 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(monopolization possible if market-dominating patent obtained by fraud for
nonpatentable invention but appearing to have sufficient "colorable validity" to
intimidate actual or potential rivals; refusal to dismiss complaint even though
plaintiff alleged relevant market of "electronic storybooks," within which market
there were apparently numerous non-infringing products); see also Agere Sys.
Guardian Corp. v. Proxim, Inc., 190 F.Supp. 2d 726 (D. Del. Mar. 6, 2002)
(antitrust counterclaimant sufficiently pled that infringement plaintiff was attempting
to enforce patent obtained by fraud).
And see Andrx Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Elan Corp., PLC, 421 F.3d 1227
(11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting antitrust claim that patent infringement suit was
fraudulent because patent was not enforceable due to on-sale bar, where two
other courts had already concluded that the on-sale bar did not apply so as to
defeat the patent); Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 1999)
(Noerr and PRE protected filing of trademark and trade dress infringement
counterclaims when these were found not to be objectively baseless); Novo
Nordisk of N. America v. Genentech, Inc., 885 F.Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(patentee's infringement claim before international agency not objectively baseless
simply because the claim was ultimately dismissed for discovery-related
misconduct; magistrate had found some evidence of infringement).
71

Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc. (Handgards I), 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
72

The antitrust plaintiff later succeeded in doing so. Handgards, Inc. v.
Ethicon, Inc. (Handgards II), 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1190 (1985). Because proving the patentee's bad faith for this purpose necessarily
proved a "sham" exception to Noerr's privilege to sue, the court also held that
requiring a jury instruction on the Noerr issue would be duplicative. Id. at 1295.
The Federal Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit in Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal
Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also FMC Corp. v. The Manitowoc Co.,
654 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (requiring clear
and convincing evidence); Tennant Co. v. Hako Minuteman, 651 F. Supp. 945
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the Federal Circuit emphasized that every patent enjoys a strong
presumption of validity, 73 and the one seeking to show invalidity has
the burden of proof. 74
The court further declared that one
challenging an infringement action on an invalid patent as an
antitrust violation must show specific intent, not merely negligence or
even recklessness with respect to the invalidity of the patent. 75 That
requirement seems consistent with the PRE requirement, discussed
above, that the inquiry into "sham" consist of two parts. First, one
must determine on the basis of objective information whether the
infringement suit was unreasonable under the circumstances.
Second, and "[o]nly if challenged litigation is objectively meritless
may a court examine the litigant's subjective motivation." 76
The infringement plaintiff's subjective knowledge that a patent
is invalid or unenforceable would make an enforcement suit
exclusionary, as would its knowledge that the patent is otherwise
unenforceable because of the patentee's misuse or some other
equitable factor. However, the difficulty of knowing when a court will
deem a valid patent unenforceable means that we can seldom find
the infringement suit improper merely because a court refuses to
enforce a valid patent. Thus the Eighth Circuit found no antitrust
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (same).
73

As provided by 35 U.S.C. '282 (providing that both patent as a whole and
each individual claim made in a patent enjoys presumption of validity, even if
another claim has proved to be invalid; burden of proof on person alleging
invalidity).
74

American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). See also Technicon Instruments Corp. v.
Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 417 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (mere bringing of a single
infringement action on patent subsequently found invalid does not establish
antitrust violation); Carlisle Corp. v. Hayes, 635 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
75

725 F.2d at 1368.

76

PRE, note 14 at 1928. See Scientific Drilling Intl v. Gyrodata Corp., 215
F.3d 1351, 1999 WL 674511 (Fed.Cir. 1999, unpublished) (since it had not yet
been determined whether infringement plaintiff's suit was objectively baseless, it
was premature to dismiss antitrust counterclaim); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v.
Comfortex Corp., 44 F.Supp.2d 145 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (on pretrial motion,
separating patent infringement trial from antitrust counterclaim trial, because
patentee's success on the first would make the second unnecessary). Accord
Ecrix Corp. v. Exabyte Corp., 191 F.R.D.611 (D.Colo. 2000).
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violation when a firm sued to enforce a patent that was valid but
determined to be unenforceable because of the patentee's "unfair"
conduct. 77 Similarly, the antitrust defendant in Argus had engaged in
inequitable conduct before the patent office by failing to disclose
sales of the patented product that had been made more than one
year before the application was filed. 78 The court declined to find an
antitrust violation without proof of "knowing and willful patent fraud"
that is "based on the use of an invalid patent to monopolize. ..." 79
And the FMC court held that "inequitable conduct" before the patent
office is not enough, for negligent or even grossly negligent failure to
disclose a material fact that might have led to nonissuance of a
patent showed no more than "inequitable conduct." 80 Fraud requires
knowledge and specific intent to obtain an undeserved patent.
Clearly, however, if the antitrust defendant knew it was not
entitled to relief because its patent was not enforceable, then its
conduct could be both exclusionary and unprotected by either
Noerr 81 or PRE. In sum, obtaining a patent by inequitable conduct
falling short of fraud is not an antitrust violation; but bringing an
infringement action with the subjective or readily discoverable
knowledge that the patent is unenforceable may constitute a
violation.
77

du Pont v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1273-1275 (8th Cir. 1980).

78

Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir.
1987); accord Dippin' Dots, note 55.
79

Id. at 1385, quoting SSP Agric. Equip., Inc. v. Orchard-Rite Ltd., 592 F.2d
1096, 1103-1104 (9th Cir. 1979).
80

FMC, note 72, 835 F.2d at 1415 & n.9. See also Korody-Colyer Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 828 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Minn. Mining & Mfg. v.
Research Medical, 691 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Utah 1988) (antitrust plaintiff must show
"intentional fraud in the common law sense": misrepresentation of a material fact
going to the validity of the patent with knowledge of its falsity and reliance by the
Patent Office on this misrepresentation in issuing the patent). Cf. Glaverbel
Society Anonyme v. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(defendant did not procure patent fraudulently or even engage in inequitable
conduct when its initial patent application failed to refer to two similar patents, but
the initial application was not required to do so; and where the company
subsequently narrowed the scope of its patent upon patent office's re-examination;
none of this came close to proving intent to deceive by clear and convincing
evidence).
81

See 1 Antitrust Law &203 (3d ed. 2006).
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Finally, the antitrust defendant is entitled to summary
judgment unless the evidence shows that the facts necessary to
support the antitrust plaintiff's claim are more likely than not to be
true. 82 This means not merely that the evidence must be consistent
with the defendant's possession of the requisite knowledge or intent,
but also that the evidence justifies the conclusion that such
possession was more probable than not. Nonetheless, some courts
continue to be quite reluctant to grant summary judgment. 83
Patent valid but not infringed
The same considerations discussed previously generally
apply when the patent in question is of undisputed validity, but the
infringement plaintiff took insufficient steps to ensure that the
infringement defendant was actually an infringer. 84 Of course, the
patentee may have been careless. But the monopolist might pursue
a policy of protecting its market by launching a lawsuit against every
rival product appearing on the scene, without regard to actual
infringement, and simply to deter small rivals from entering.

82

See 2 Antitrust Law &308.

83

E.g., Carlisle, note 74 at 965-967 (refusing summary judgment even
though there was no evidence offered of fraud on the patent office by the antitrust
defendant, but merely of some controversy as to the state of the prior art). See
also ID Security Systems Canada, Inc. v. Checkpoint Systems, Inc., 249 F. Supp.
2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 2003), amended by 268 F.Supp. 2d 448 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
(troublesome dicta that evidence of patentee's previous patent infringement
actions were admissible on question of anticompetitive intent, even though there
was no evidence that the infringement actions were improper; relying on Kobe, Inc.
v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 425 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
837 (1953); ultimately dismissing claim on market power grounds); Applera Corp.
v. MJ Research, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D. Conn. 2004) (evidence that patent
owner priced licenses for its two patents in a way that forced licensees to take both
even if they only wanted one was admissible relevant to antitrust counterclaim to
infringement action, as well as patent misuse defense).
84

The question of claim construction is closely related. In general, the scope
of the "claim" made in the patent application presents a question of law. See
Markman and other decisions cited in note 40. In such cases the infringement
defendant may not dispute the validity of the patent but alleges that it is not an
infringer because the claim is to be construed more narrowly than the infringement
plaintiff alleges.
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The PRE objective standard asks mainly whether the
patentee exercised reasonable care in determining the fact of
infringement. Although we cannot discuss the many possibilities, a
few illustrations and principles may be stated.
When the monopolist is vindicating a product patent, we can
at least insist that it inspect the allegedly infringing article and draw a
reasonable conclusion of infringement before filing its infringement
suit or taking other actions, such as writing letters to customers, that
might injure the alleged infringer's market position. 85 This restriction
applies regardless of any sincere belief the monopolist might have
about the impossibility of a non-infringing product in its field. 86
The product itself may not reveal the presence or absence of
an infringed process patent. In that case, the monopolist should be
compelled to request a reasonable opportunity to inspect the
allegedly infringing process before attacking. Once these
preliminaries have occurred, we hesitate to appraise too precisely
the monopolist-patentee's judgment about infringement -- especially
in an infringement suit where the infringement defendant might want
to divert the suit from the question of infringement to the plaintiff's
reasonableness in suing. The patentee should not be forced to sue
at its peril. Yet, neither should its discretion be completely immune
from review. Accordingly, we conclude that a monopolist-patentee's
judgment in attacking an infringer may be tested for reasonableness
in any appropriate suit, but the alleged infringer must overcome a
presumption of reasonableness in favor of a patentee whose
behavior appears reasonable on its face. We emphasize that issues
concerning the legal question of infringement and the facts that
constitute it are to be addressed directly under the patent laws.
85

The court did so insist in Kobe v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 424
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952). See also Ecrix, note 38, 95
F.Supp.2d 1155 (permitting antitrust plaintiff discovery into factual basis for
infringement plaintiff's allegation that former's technology infringed the latter's
patent).
86

Such a rule might be thought futile because antitrust law is not likely to
interfere very effectively with a patentee's propensity to sue once it goes through
the motions of inspecting the allegedly infringing article. But even if some
patentees sue with undetected bad faith, encouraging proper forms of conduct can
beneficially influence the substance of behavior. This limited intervention,
moreover, may threaten an appraisal of the patentee's judgment in suing and
thereby deter some undesirable conduct.
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Government guidelines
Guidelines issued by the Justice Department set forth the
circumstances under which it will prosecute a patent infringement
action as unlawful monopolization. 87
Somewhat inconsistently,
those Guidelines provide that "Enforcement of a patent obtained by
mere inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office,
however, cannot be the basis of a section 2 claim, because
inequitable conduct does not involve knowing and willful patent
fraud" but also that "An objectively baseless infringement action,
brought in bad faith, when the complainant knows the intellectual
property right to be invalid, may violate section 2 of the Sherman
Act." 88 As indicated earlier, we believe that the second of these
propositions is the more accurate statement of the law.
Antitrust Challenge as Compulsory or Permissive Counterclaim;
Declaratory Judgment and Direct Action Alternatives
Counterclaim
In most cases the antitrust challenge to an infringement action is
presented as a counterclaim to the infringement suit itself. If such
counterclaims are classified as "compulsory" they must be brought
as counterclaims or will be barred by principles of res judicata. If,
however, the antitrust counterclaim is permissive then failure to bring
it will not preclude a subsequent and independent antitrust challenge
to the infringement action. 89
87

See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual
Property '6.0 (1995), reprinted in 59 Fed. Reg. 41,339. These Guidelines are
reprinted as Appendix C to the Supplement.
88

Id. at '6.

89

See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), which states in relevant part:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of
serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

See 6 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice &
Procedure '1417 (Civ. 2d 1990 & 2008 Supp.); Michael D. Conway, Comment,
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The trend is to find such counterclaims to be compulsory and
thus barred if not timely brought during the pendency of the
infringement suit.
The Second Circuit's Critical-Vac decision
distinguished between antitrust counterclaims to the infringement
suit, which should be treated as compulsory, from claims and
defenses of patent misuse, which might be treated as permissive. 90
The Supreme Court's controversial Mercoid decision 91 had treated
the latter as permissive, and the Second Circuit felt obliged to
reconcile it with emergent doctrine holding that antitrust
counterclaims to infringement actions are best regarded as
compulsory. It reasoned:
Antitrust claims based on patent misuse, such as the
counterclaims in Mercoid, are likely to involve factual issues
distinct from those involved in patent infringement litigation
Narrowing the Scope of Rule 13(A), 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 141, 156 (1993).
On related procedural issues see Arthrocare Corp. v. Smith & Nephew,
Inc., 406 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (refusing to dismiss antitrust counterclaim until
antitrust plaintiff could respond on baselessness issue); Donnelly Corp. v. Reitter &
Schefenacker, USA, 2002 WL 31418042, 2002-2 Trade Cas. &73,817 WD. Mich.
Aug. 13, 2002) (granting infringement plaintiff's request to bifurcate trial of
infringement claim and patent counterclaim; but not to stay discovery on the
counterclaim; permitting all discovery to go forward would prevent discovery
disputes and facilitate settlement).
90

Critical-Vac Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman Int=l, Inc., 233 F.3d 697 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001). See also Eon Labs, Inc. v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D. Mass. 2003) (antitrust challenge to
patent infringement suit is compulsory counterclaim; following Critical-Vac); Jarrow
Formulas v. International Nutrition Co., 175 F.Supp. 2d 296 (D. Conn. 2001)
(distinguishing Critical-Vac decision discussed in the main text: where some of the
facts supporting the antitrust claim occurred after resolution of prior patent
infringement suit, the antitrust claim could not be treated as a compulsory
counterclaim to that prior suit). Cf. Xerox Corp. v SCM Corp., 576 F.2d 1057, 1061
(3d Cir. 1978) (antitrust counterclaim not compulsory as to large antitrust suit
challenging many aspects of defendant's conduct). But when the underlying claim
is simply for infringement and the basic defense to the infringement action is
essentially the same as the counterclaim, the latter is compulsory. Accord
Koufakis v. Carvel, 425 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1970); United Artists Corp. v.
Masterpiece Prods., Inc.., 221 F.2d 213, 216 (2d Cir. 1955). See 6 Wright, Miller &
Kane, note 89 at ''1411-1412.
91

Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
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between the same parties... In contrast, antitrust claims
based on patent invalidity, such as C-Vac's claims in the
instant case, will generally involve the same factual issues as
those involved in patent infringement litigation between the
same parties.... 92
This reasoning is not entirely persuasive. Some misuse
claims raise precisely the same issues as arise in an antitrust claim
and all necessary facts are known to the infringement defendant at
the time of the infringement suit. For example, perhaps the
infringement plaintiff requires the defendant to use tied, staple
commodities with the patent and its failure to do so forms the basis
for the infringement claim. 93 In such cases there is no reason not to
make the antitrust counterclaim compulsory. In other cases -- such
as when the patent is procured by fraud but the facts are not
revealed until after the infringement suit has run its course -- justice
is poorly served by a rule that prevents a subsequent antitrust
challenge. 94
When the facts supporting the antitrust counterclaim are the
same as those supporting the infringement defense, a compulsory
counterclaim rule economizes on judicial resources and tends toward
the efficient resolution of disputes. For example, if the defense is
that the theory of infringement is legally frivolous, the patent is clearly
invalid or has expired, or the defendant's technology is obviously not
infringing, then many of the facts necessary to support the antitrust
counterclaim are implicit in the defense itself. Other facts, such as
market power or the dangerous probability of success in achieving it
can be developed through discovery.
Making antitrust counterclaims compulsory is less sensible,
however, when the facts needed to support the counterclaim are not
sufficiently known at the time the infringement action is brought. In
such cases a compulsory counterclaim rule requires the infringement
defendant to bring an antitrust claim that would be treated as
92

Critical-Vac, 223 F.3d at 703. See also USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies,
Inc.102 F.R.D. 167 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (making the same distinction).
93

See 10 Antitrust Law &1781b,d.

94

For fuller treatment, see Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, note 40 at '5.5.
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unfounded or even frivolous if brought through the usual process.
The outcome is particularly serious if the facts needed to support the
antitrust counterclaim are not known until after the filing deadline for
counterclaims has passed or, worse yet, after the trial is over. 95
As a result, some allowance must be given to an infringement
defendant forced to file its antitrust counterclaim before the full facts
or the full impact of any antitrust violation is known. For example, it
would be perverse to hold that an antitrust claim is compulsory and
thus cannot be brought later, but also that the infringement
defendant lacks standing to bring the antitrust counterclaim because
it has not yet perfected entry into the market.96
"Affirmative" use of Walker Process: suits under Declaratory
Judgment Act or direct Sherman Act suits
A counterclaim naturally presupposes an underlying
infringement claim to which it is attached. If the owner of an
improperly obtained patent institutes enforcement actions falling
short of an infringement suit, then the target's only recourse may be
to institute their own action. The Declaratory Judgment Act 97
95

See American Packaging Corp. v. Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc.,
1995 WL 262522, 1995-1 Trade Cas. &71,009 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (infringement
defendant claimed that information about fraudulent procurement of patent
became available only very late in the infringement suit); see also Hydranautics,
note 49, 204 F.3d at 886 (infringement defendant properly pled that infringement
plaintiff committed perjury at infringement trial and that in absence of perjured
testimony it would have lacked probable cause to pursue infringement action).
If new facts emerge after the litigation or if the infringement plaintiff
committed fraud or other misconduct, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60b1
permits the judge to give a party relief from the judgment provided that motion is
made within a reasonable time, or within one year after entry of judgment.
96

Cf. Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche LTD, 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75766
(D.Mass. March 30, 2007) (rival who was target of patent infringement actions had
standing to assert counterclaim even though it was not yet producing in the
market, where FDA approval was "imminent" -- better rule here, if the infringement
defendant is close enough to entry that a patent infringement suit or threat of it is
forthcoming, then it has standing to maintain the antitrust action; further, expenses
of litigating the patent could constitute "antitrust injury").
97

28 U.S.C. '2201.
What we say here is not intended to be a
comprehensive treatment of Declaratory Judgment actions in this legal setting.
For that, see 10B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal
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contemplates such actions, 98 and some courts have permitted a
direct antitrust challenge under the Sherman Act.
For example, in Unitherm that patentee wrote threatening
letters to numerous firms, including customers of the challenger. 99
The claimant brought a Declaratory Judgment action asserting
Walker Process-like claims, and the Federal Circuit concluded that a
plaintiff in the claimant's position "may bring a Declaratory Judgment
Action of patent invalidity ... even in the absence of overt
enforcement actions. 100 The Federal Circuit observed that merely
obtaining a patent whose claims conflicted with the technology of the
Declaratory Judgment plaintiff would be insufficient to raise the type
of threat of harm that the Declaratory Judgment Act contemplated.
However, threatening communications, even if not directed at the
claimant itself, could be sufficient. Just as the mere obtaining of a
patent, with no subsequent enforcement activity, would not violate
Walker Process, so too it would not give rise to a Declaratory
Judgment action. 101
In Hydril the Federal Circuit went one step further, holding that
a firm could file a Sherman Act lawsuit directly against a patentee
who had threatened the antitrust plaintiff's customers and supplier
after widely publicizing its patent in the market, even though it knew
that the patent was invalidated by prior art. 102 The Federal Circuit
Practice and Procedure, '2751-2759 (Civ. 3d 2007).
98

See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 764 (2007), holding
that a licensee did not need to repudiate its license agreement as a condition of
having a "case or controversy" sufficient to invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act.
99

Unitherm, note 20.

100

Id., 375 F.3d at 1358. See also Highway Equipment Co., Inc. v. Cives
Corp., 476 F.Supp.2d 1079 (N.D.Ia. 2007).
101

See, e.g., Microchip Technology Inc. v. The Chamberlain Group, 441 F.3d
936 (Fed.Cir.2006) (no jurisdiction under Declaratory Judgment Act when DJ
plaintiff did not face reasonable apprehension of suit).
102

Hydril Co. LP v. Grant Prideco LP, 474 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Contrast Merchandising Technologies, Inc. v. Telefonix, Inc., 2007-1 Trade Cas.
&75598 (D.Ore. Feb. 7, 2007) (minimum degree of enforcement necessary to
support Walker Process claim is that needed to establish actual controversy for
purposes of declaratory judgment act; here not even enough controversy to
establish that; in fact, the patentee had simply sent out to its customers a notice of
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rejected the district court's conclusion that an affirmative claim would
lie only if the patentee's enforcement action lay against the antitrust
claimant itself, as would normally be the case in a Declaratory
Judgment Action. The court observed:
To the extent the district court's ruling may have been based
on Hydril's failure to allege threatened enforcement action
against Hydril rather than against its customers, a valid
Walker Process claim may be based upon enforcement
activity directed against the plaintiff's customers. Threats of
patent litigation against customers, based on a fraudulentlyprocured patent, with a reasonable likelihood that such threats
will cause the customers to cease dealing with their supplier,
is the kind of economic coercion that the antitrust laws are
intended to prevent. A supplier may be equally injured if it
loses its share of the market because its customers stop
dealing with it than if its competitor directs its monopolistic
endeavors against the supplier itself. Without customers, a
supplier has no business. 103
the existence of its patent).
Of course, consumers as well as competitors can bring direct actions. See
Netflix Antitrust Litigation, 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75749 (N.D.Cal. June 14, 2007)
(consumers had standing to challenge alleged Walker Process violation; ultimately
deciding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim; allegations were merely that
Netflix obtained its patents fraudulently; plaintiffs could not show that any rival was
actually excluded by the patents); Molecular Diagnostics Labs. v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 276, 280 (D.D.C. 2005) (purchasers have standing).
Cf. DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75726
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006) (odd, apparently incorrect alternative holding that direct
purchasers of drug lacked standing to assert Walker Process claim alleging that
defendant used improperly procured patent to keep generics off market resulting in
higher prices for its own drug; court holds that because Walker Process is founded
in patent, only infringement defendant/competitor has standing to assert it; but if '2
is violated and results in higher prices, consumers are clearly appropriate
plaintiffs). The language from Walker Process that the DDAVP court cites states
only that enforcement of a fraudulently obtained patent is exclusionary vis-a-vis the
competitor/infringement defendant; but all exclusionary practices fit into that
classification).
103

Id. at 1350. On remand the district court dismissed the complaint once
again, declaring mainly that the plaintiff lacked standing because it had shown
insufficient intent and preparedness to enter the market covered by the patent.
Hydril Co. v. Grant Prideco, L.P., 2007-2 Trade Cas. &75769 (S.D.Tx. June 19,
2007).
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Remedies
The antitrust violation for an improper infringement suit
presupposes that the patent in question is either invalid or
unenforceable, or else that the infringement defendant's technology
does not infringe. As a result, remedies such as compulsory
licensing are generally inapt. No one needs a license to copy the
technology described in an invalid patent; nor does the person
whose technology does not infringe. At the very least, antitrust
remedies can include an injunction against future, similar conduct.
But in most cases such a remedy would not be of much value.
Probably the most appropriate remedy is damages to the
infringement defendant (or potential infringement defendants) whose
entry, growth, or sales have been stifled by the infringement plaintiff's
wrongful conduct. Currently the circuit courts are divided on the
question whether the costs of defending a wrongfully brought
infringement action subsequently found to be an antitrust violation
are recoverable as antitrust damages. 104
On principle, the cases permitting such damages seem
correct. Infringement suits are designed to raise the entry costs of
rivals, and clearly the cost of defending such suits is part of the
"cost" of entry. Further, of all the damages suffered by such plaintiffs
-- loss of sales, loss of market share, loss of prospective entry
opportunities -- the costs of litigating the infringement suit are by far
the most certain and easy to measure.
On Hydril, see Christopher R. Leslie, New Possibilities for Asserting
Walker Process Claims, 21 Antitrust 48 (Summer, 2007).
104

See Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 448 F.2d 872, 882-883 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972) (denying such recovery); Premier Elec. Constr.
Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Assn., 814 F.2d 358, 371-372 (7th Cir. 1987)
(permitting it); Handgards II, note 72, 743 F.2d at 1297-1298 (same); Kearney &
Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, 562 F.2d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 1977) (same);
Am. Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 360 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 920 (1966) (same); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. V. Rambus, Inc.,
527 F.Supp.2d 1084 (N.D.Cal. 2007); Marchoti Eyezvear v. Tura LP, 2002 WL
31253199 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002) (same); IGT v. Alliance Gaming Corp., 2007-1
Trade Cas. &75687 (D.Nev. March 22, 2007) (same); Van Well Nursery, Inc. v.
Mony Life Insurance Co., 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75705 (E.D.Wash. March 6, 2007)
(same).
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Of course, damages need not be limited to the costs of
defending the improper suit. Such suits may also cause loss of
sales, premature exit from the market, precluded entry, all of which
invoke more traditional measures of damages.

